6/21/2022 12:00 PM 19CR53042

MULTNOMAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF OREGON, PLAINTIFF, No. 19CR53042

JOSEPH GIBSON'S

vs. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

JOSEPH GIBSON,

1

2

3

4

5

DEFENDANT.

COMES NOW Joseph Gibson and moves the Court to charge the jury according to the

below listed instructions on the law. These proposed instructions are derived from the

Constitutions, case law, statutes, and from Oregon's pattern instructions.¹

Respectfully submitted this Tuesday, June 21, 2022.

/s/ D. Angus Lee /s/James L. Buchal

D. Angus Lee, OSB No. 213139

Angus Lee Law Firm, PLLC

James L. Buchal, OSB No. 921618

MURPHY & BUCHAL LLP

9105A NE HWY 99 Suite 200 P.O. Box 86620 Vancouver, WA 98665 Portland, OR 97286 Phone: 360 635 6464 Tel: 503-227-1011

Phone: 360.635.6464 Tel: 503-227-1011 Fax: 888.509.8268 Fax: 503-573-1939

E-mail: Angus@AngusLeeLaw.com E-mail: jbuchal@mbllp.com

Attorney for Defendant Joseph Gibson Attorney for Defendant Joseph Gibson

1 The phrase "the defendant" as used in pattern instructions has been replaced by "Mr. Gibson."

1

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. No. 19CR53042 Tuesday, June 21, 2022 ANGUS LEE LAW FIRM, PLLC 9105A NE HWY 99, STE 200 Vancouver, WA 98665 (P) 360-635-6464 (F) 888-509-8268

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 3 4	I, D. Angus Lee, hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Oregon that the following facts are true and correct:
5 6	I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years.
7 8 9 10	On Tuesday, June 21, 2022, I caused this document to be served in the following manner on the parties listed below:
10	Brad Kalbaugh () (BY FIRST CLASS US MAIL) Multnomah County District Attorney's Office (X) (BY E-MAIL) 600 Multnomah County Courthouse () (BY FAX) 1021 SW 4th Ave () (BY HAND) Portland OR 97204 brad.kalbaugh@mcda.us
11	/s/ D. Angus Lee
	DRODOGED HIDV INCERTICATIONS

1	No
2	It is for you and you alone to decide whether to believe a witness's testimony. Witnesses
3	are not permitted to give opinions on whether another witness is, or was, being truthful in any
4	given statement. Despite the court's efforts to prevent such testimony, a witness's testimony occa-
5	sionally can be interpreted as an opinion on another witness's truthfulness in regards to a particular
6	statement. If that occurs, you should not give any weight to the witness's opinion about the
7	credibility of that statement. You are the sole arbiters of the facts in this case and thus must
8	disregard any other witness's opinion about the credibility of any account of the underlying events.
9	
10	UCrJI 1006A
11	VOUCHING

1	No
2	All defendants are innocent unless and until they are proven guilty beyond a reasonable
3	doubt. The burden is on the state, and the state alone, to prove the guilt of each individual defendant
4	beyond a reasonable doubt.
5	Reasonable doubt is doubt based on common sense and reason. Reasonable doubt is not an
6	imaginary doubt. Reasonable doubt means an honest uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant.
7	You must return a verdict of not guilty if, after careful and impartial consideration of all the
8	evidence in the case, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty.
9	
10	UCrJI No. 1009
11	INNOCENCE OF DEFENDANT—PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

1	No
2	Each defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. Therefore, any
3	defendant's decision not to testify cannot be considered as an indication of guilt for that defendant
4	or any other defendant. It should not be commented on or in any way considered by you in your
5	deliberations.
6	Each defendant also has an absolute constitutional right not to present any evidence.
7	Therefore, a defendant's decision not to present any evidence cannot be considered as an indication
8	of guilt as to any defendant. It should not be commented on or in any way considered by you in
9	your deliberations.
10	Even though each defendant has the right not to testify, no defendant has the right to compel
11	another defendant to testify even if such testimony would be helpful to the defendant who wishes
12	to call another defendant as a witness in his or her defense.
13	
14	UCrJI No. 1021 (modified)
15	DEFENDANT NOT TESTIFYING

1	No [Subject to motion in limine]
2	If you find that a defendant has been previously convicted of a crime, you may consider
3	this conviction only for its bearing, if any, on the credibility of that individual defendant.
4	Specifically, you <i>may not</i> use this evidence for the purpose of drawing the inference that
5	because the defendant was convicted of a previous crime the defendant may be guilty of the crime
6	charged in this case.
7	
8	UCrJI No. 1023 (emphasis added) (modified)
9	DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION
10	COMMENT: OEC 609. If the conviction has been received for a purpose under OEC 404(3)
11	or OEC 404(4), a special instruction may have to be drafted. See also the comment at UCrJI No.
12	1022.

1	No
2	When a witness testifies about statements made by a defendant, you should consider such
3	testimony with caution.
4	In reviewing such testimony, you should consider, among other things, the following:
5	1) Did that defendant make the statement, and, if so, did that defendant clearly express
6	what that defendant intended to say?
7	2) Did the witness correctly hear and understand what that defendant said?
8	3) Did the witness correctly remember and relate what that defendant said?
9	4) Did the witness intentionally or mistakenly alter some of that defendant's words,
10	thereby changing the meaning of what was actually said?
11	If, after weighing such factors, you conclude that that defendant said what that defendant
12	intended to say and that the witness to the statement correctly understood, remembered, and related
13	to you what that defendant said, then you are authorized to consider such statements for what you
14	deem them to be worth.
15	
16	UCrJI 1024 (modified)
17	DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS
18	COMMENT: ORS 10.095(4); State v. Bouse, 199 Or 676, 698–700, 264 P2d 800 (1953), overruled
19	on other grounds, State v. Fischer, 232 Or 558, 565, 376 P2d 418 (1962). This instruction is an
20	ORS 10.095 statutorily required instruction. It must be given in appropriate cases when requested
21	by the defense, that is, when "there is evidence to support it." State v. Swee, 51 Or App 249, 253,
22	624 P2d 1108 (1981); see State v. McKenna, 67 Or App 662, 665, 679 P2d 346 (1984) (in context
	PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. No. 19CR53042 ANGUS LEE LAW FIRM, PLLC 9105A NE HWY 99, STE 200

1	of DUI case). In Swee, one of the reasons that the trial judge did not give the uniform "oral
2	admission" instruction requested by the defendant was that the judge felt that the instruction
3	labeled a questionably incriminating statement as an "admission." The conviction was reversed on
4	appeal. The Committee believes it is preferable to refer to the defendant's statement as a
5	"statement" and leave it to the jury to determine whether or not it is also an "admission."

1	No
2	The state has the burden to establish the guilt of each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
3	When you evaluate the state's evidence, you may also consider the power of the state to gather
4	and produce evidence.
5	If the evidence offered by the state was weaker and less satisfactory than other stronger or
6	more satisfactory evidence that the state could have offered, then you should view the weaker and
7	less satisfactory evidence with distrust.
8	
9	UCrJI 1030 (modified)
10	LESS SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE

1	No
2	A person acts "knowingly" or "with knowledge" if that person acts with an awareness the
3	his or her conduct is of a particular nature.
4	When used in the phrase "did unlawfully and knowingly, while participating with 5 or more
5	other persons engage in tumultuous and violent conduct thereby intentionally and recklessly
6	creating a grave risk of causing public alarm," "knowingly" means that the person acted with an
7	awareness that his or her conduct was tumultuous and violent.
8	When used in the phrase "did unlawfully and knowingly, while participating with 5 or more
9	other persons engage in tumultuous and violent conduct thereby intentionally and recklessly
10	creating a grave risk of causing public alarm," "knowingly" also means that the person acted with
11	an awareness that he or she was participating with five or more other persons who were also engage
12	in tumultuous and violent conduct.
13	
14	
15	UCrJI 1036 (modified); State v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 310, 505 P3d 953 (2022); State v.
16	Prophet, 318 Or App 330, 350, 507 P3d 735 (2022) ("all elements other than venue, statute of
17	limitations, and the like, "necessarily require[] a culpable mental state" under ORS 161.095(2),
18	regardless of whether the statute provides an explicit mental state"); In re M.A.WS., 319 OR.
19	App. 426, 507 P3d 1291 (2022) (following <i>Prophet</i> , and finding that "participating with five or
20	more persons" "necessarily requires a culpable mental state").).
21	KNOWINGLY AND WITH KNOWLEDGE
	DDODOSED HIDV INSTRUCTIONS ANGLIS LEELAW FIRM DLLC

1	No
2	A person acts "intentionally" or "with intent" when that person acts with a conscious
3	objective to cause a particular result.
4	When used in the phrase "intentionally and recklessly creating a grave risk of causing
5	public alarm", "intentionally" means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause to create
6	a grave risk of causing public alarm.
7	
8	UCrJI 1035
9	INTENTIONALLY AND WITH INTENT

1	No
2	A person acts recklessly if that person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
3	and unjustifiable risk that a particular result will occur. The risk must be of such nature and degree
4	that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
5	would observe in the situation.
6	When used in the phrase "recklessly creating a grave risk of causing public alarm",
7	"recklessly" means that person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
8	unjustifiable risk that public alarm will occur. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
9	disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
10	would observe in the situation.
11	Recklessness is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.
12	
13	UCrJI 1037
14	RECKLESSLY

1	No
2	Public place means a place to which the general public has access. It includes, but is not
3	limited to, hallways, lobbies, and other parts of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms
4	or apartments designed for actual residence. It also includes highways, streets, schools, places of
5	amusement, parks, playgrounds, and premises used in connection with public passenger
6	transportation.
7	
8	UCrJI 1047
9	PUBLIC PLACE

1	No
2	If you determine that a witness was an accomplice, then you should view that witness's
3	testimony with distrust.
4	
5	UCrJI 1057
6	ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY (View with Distrust)

1	No
2	Although the defendants are being tried together, you must consider the case against each
3	separately. In doing so, you must decide what the evidence shows as to each defendant, without
4	considering any evidence that may have been received solely against some other defendant or
5	defendants. Each defendant is entitled to have the case decided on the evidence and on the law
6	applicable to that defendant.
7	
8	UCrJI No. 1059
9	SEPARATE CONSIDERATION FOR EACH DEFENDANT

1	No
2	The defenses of self-defense and defense of another person has been raised. A defendant
3	is justified in using physical force on another person to defend himself or a third party from what
4	a defendant reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force. In
5	defending, a person may only use that degree of force which he reasonably believes to be
6	necessary.
7	The burden of proof is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense
8	does not apply.
9	
10	UCrJI No. 1107
11	DEFENSE—PHYSICAL FORCE—DEFENSE OF PERSON

1	No
2	Ordinarily, a person is not justified in using physical force on others if he was the initial
3	aggressor. However, a defendant's use of physical force may be justified even though he was the
4	aggressor, if you find that a defendant withdrew from the encounter and effectively communicated
5	to others an intent to withdraw from the encounter, but the others nevertheless continued or
6	threatened to continue the use of unlawful physical force on the defendant.
7	
8	UCrJI No. 1110, modified for the riot context.
9	DEFENSE—USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE
10	IN DEFENSE OF PERSON—AGGRESSION

1	No
2	Violent and tumultuous conduct means physical acts of violence that are immediately
3	likely to produce the use of physical force.
4	
5	UCrJI No. 2300(6) (developed for ORS 166.025(a) charge, edited for consistency with
6	State v. Cantwell, 66 Or App 848, 853, 676 P2d 353 (1984) ("We do not read the statute to
7	encompass speech in the term "behavior," but construe it to refer only to physical acts o
8	violence.") The form charge's unmodified reference to "physical conduct" does not adequately
9	protect constitutional rights of speech in a context where a demonstration can be construed as
10	"physical conduct".
11	

1	No
2	The term tumultuous and violent conduct is intended to represent more than mere loud
3	noise or disturbance. The term is designed to imply terroristic mob behavior involving ominous
4	threats of personal injury and property damage.
5	
6	State v. Goodwill, 35 Or. App. 293, 297, 581 P.2d 113, 115 (1978).

1	No	
2	The term tumultuous and violent conduct does not include political speech or protest.	
3		
4	State v. Chakerian, 325 Ore. 370 (1997).	

1 No. ____

2 A person does not commit the crime of riot if he or she merely is part of a group and five

3 other members of that group engage in tumultuous and violent conduct that intentionally or

4 recklessly creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.

5

6 State v. Chakerian, 325 Ore. 370, 375 n 8 (1997).

1	No
2	To prove the crime of riot, the state must prove that the person charged <i>personally</i> engaged
3	in violent and tumultuous conduct.
4	
5	State v. Chakerian, 325 Ore. 370, 375 n 8 (1997). [To be used if the UCrJI 2301is given
6	in unmodified form]

1		No
2	О	regon law provides that a person commits the crime of riot if, while participating with
3	five or m	nore other persons, the person engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby
4	intentiona	ally or recklessly creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.
5	In	this case, to establish the crime of riot, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
6	the follow	ving elements:
7	1)	The act occurred on or about May 1, 2019;
8	2)	Mr. Gibson, while participating with five or more persons, personally engaged in
9		tumultuous and violent conduct; and
10	3)	Mr. Gibson, by engaging personally in such conduct, intentionally or recklessly created
11		a grave risk of causing public alarm.
12		
13		UCrJI 2301, modified to insert the constitutional limitation required under State v.
14		Chakerian, 325 Ore. 370, 375 n 8 (1997).
15		RIOT

1	No
2	To convict Mr. Gibson of any crime all members of the jury must unanimously agree on
3	the verdict.
4	
5	U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.

1	No
2	The right to assemble and engage in advocacy in a traditional public forum such as a public
3	sidewalk is conduct in the furtherance of constitutionally protected free speech under the First
4	Amendment, and a defendant cannot be found guilty of riot for constitutionally-protected First
5	Amendment conduct.
6	
7	See Hill v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 703, 714-15, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2002)
8	(noting that "the First Amendment interests of petitioners are clear and undisputed" because "their
9	leafleting, sign displays and oral communications are protected by the First Amendment," and that
10	the "public sidewalks, streets and ways" where they chose to exercise their rights "are
11	'quintessential' public forums for free speech."); NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
12	(1958) ("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
13	ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized
14	by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.").

1	No
2	A claim that the exercise of free speech was intended to exercise a coercive impact on
3	others does not remove the conduct from the protections of the First Amendment.
4	
5	See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S. Ct. 1575, 29
6	L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1971).

1	No
2	The fact that the messages conveyed by those engaging in free speech may be offensive to
3	their recipients does not deprive them of constitutional protection.
4	
5	Hill, 580 U.S. at 715.

No. ___ 1 Free speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt, 2 because the State of Oregon may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because a local 3 4 community finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Indeed, the point of all speech protection is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. 5 6 7 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011)

1	No
2	Free speech may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
3	creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Free speech is
4	often provocative and challenging.
5	
6	Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 896 (1949).

1	No [Subject to motion for election of facts]
2	In alleging that Mr. Gibson committed riot, the State of Oregon relies upon evidence
3	regarding a single act of allegedly riotous conduct, namely, constituting the alleged crime.
4	[or, regarding the following acts of allegedly riotous conduct, namely]
5	To convict the Mr. Gibson, you must unanimously agree that this specific allegedly riotous
6	act was proved to be riotous beyond a reasonable doubt.
7	
8	11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 4.26 (4th Ed)
9	WPIC 4.26 Several Distinct Acts—Election to Specify a Particular Act
10	NOTE ON USE: This instruction may be used for a case in which the jury heard evidence
11	of multiple acts but the prosecutor has elected to specify one act as constituting the criminal
12	conduct.
13	

1	No
2	It is a defense to the crime charged that the case brought against a defendant has been
3	selectively enforced. Even if you find that a defendant committed the crime alleged, you are
4	instructed to find the defendant not guilty if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
5	law in this case has been enforced in a discriminatory manner with the intent and purpose to deny
6	equal protection of law to defendant.
7	
8	
9	
10	Oregon Constitution, Article I, § 16 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right
11	to determine the law, and the facts under the direction of the Court as to the law, and the right of
12	new trial, as in civil cases.")
13	
14	People v. Gray, 254 Cal.App.2d 256 (2d Dist. 1967).

1	No
2	In considering the conduct of those present at Cider Riot on May 1, 2019, you are instructed
3	that mere words, however insulting or opprobrious, cannot, justify an assault or violent response,
4	and that a defendant cannot be considered guilty of riot because his words provoked violence by
5	others.
6	
7	State v. Jones, 179 Or. 636, 638, 173 P.2d 960, 961 (1946).